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STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR APPEAL
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, pursuant to
Article 8 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, §78-2-2(3)(I) and
§78-2a-3 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and Rule 3 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

CONSTITUTIONAL/STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This appeal involves matters of first impression for the court.
It requests that the court interpret §2301 et seq, of the United States
Code, commonly known as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and, §70A-2-719,
Utah Code Annotated as it affects new car limited warranties under the
Magnuson-Moss Act.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the Third District Court
below, granting the respondent partial summary judgment;

denying the

plaintiff any amount of money incidental and consequential damages;
and, a judgment awarding the plaintiff the substantially discounted sum
of $10,000.00 in attorneyfs fees as opposed to the requested attorney's
fees in the amount of over $44,069.15.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

DID THE DISTRICT COURT BELOW COMMIT ERROR OF
LAW IN GRANTING THE RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING APPELLANT
ANY RECOVERY ON HIS CAUSES OF ACTION FOR
INCIDENTAL AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES?

DID THE LOWER COURT COMMIT ERROR OF LAW IN
MAKING FINDINGS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ITS
DECISION TO AWARD THE APPELLANT LESS THAN
HIS FULL CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES?

DID THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TIME OF TRIAL
SUPPORT A DECISION BY THE COURT BELOW TO
DISCOUNT THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARD?

6

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant purchased a 1982 BMW 320i motor vehicle from the
defendant, BMW of Murray, in February, 1982.

Appellant immediately

began experiencing difficulty with the vehicle and returned it for
repair to the original dealer a number of times, then to another dealer
a number of times. Having had many opportunities to repair the vehicle
(approximately 10 times), the dealer was either unable or unwilling to
repair the defects.
The appellant was then authorized by agents of the manufacturer,
BMW of North America, to take the vehicle to another BMW dealer in the
Greater Salt Lake area. Appellant took the car to Clark-Buick-DatsunGMC-BMW ("Clark") to have the defects repaired.

The Clark dealership,

again, was either unable or unwilling to repair the defects, having
also had the vehicle brought to them on approximately 10 occasions
providing them an opportunity to do so.
Defendants having failed to repair the defects in the vehicle,
the appellant filed an action against the respondents, stating, among
other things, causes of action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
Appellant's complaint was filed in the Third District Court.
As part of its Magnuson-Moss "Lemon Law" causes of action, the
appellant

requested

incidental

and

consequential

damages

as are

provided for under the Uniform Commercial Code and incorporated by
Magnuson-Moss.

Appellant further requested his attorneyfs fees and

costs of court, statutorily provided for in Magnuson-Moss.
A few days before trial, respondents made a motion for partial
summary judgment, requesting that the court dismiss appellant's cause
of action for incidental and consequential damages.
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The defendant's

theory was these damages were not available to the appellant as a
matter

of

law.

The

court

took

the

respondent's

motion under

advisement.
Trial in this matter commenced on August 1st, 1988 and was
completed the afternoon of August 2nd, 1988.
during the morning of the first day.

A jury was impaneled

Hugh Schurtz was sworn as

plaintiff's first witness, and testified concerning the problems he had
with the car during the first afternoon. The morning of the second day
of trial, counsel made additional arguments to the court in chambers
concerning the pending motion for partial summary judgment.

The court

then took the bench and announced that it had decided respondent's
motion for partial summary judgment in favor of respondent. The court
informed Mr* Schurtz that he would be barred from presenting evidence
with regard to his incidental and consequential damages.
The defendants then offered, and both parties agreed, that
the subject motor vehicle could be returned to the dealer by the
plaintiff for the purchase price, minus a credit for miles driven.
This agreement was entered into by Mr. Schurtz in lieu of presenting
his evidence on the breach and revocation issues, in return for an
agreement from defendants that he could be deemed the prevailing party
for purposes of the court's consideration of attorney's fees. This was
important because Magnuson-Moss only provided for "prevailing party"
attorneys fees. The appellant was unwilling to forego presenting his
evidence on the breach and revocation issues without the concession
from the defendant that plaintiff would be deemed the prevailing party
for purposes of attorney's fees.

The defendants so conceded.
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The issues of breech of warranty, revocation of acceptance, and
prevailing party having been disposed of by stipulation, and the court
having previously granted partial summary judgment against plaintiff
as to incidental and consequential damages,

all that was left was

issue of plaintiff's attorneyfs fees. After testimony for one-half of
one day concerning fees, the court took the matter under advisement.
Later,

in

its memorandum

decision, the

$10,000.00 in attorney's fees.

court

awarded

appellant

Appellant's actual attorney's fees

expended, as supported by testimony given at the time of trial, were
in the amount of $44,069.15.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ISSUE I; The defendant BMW gave Hugh Schurtz a limited written
warranty on the new BMW he purchased from them in 1983. The "limited"
warranty stated that Mr. Schurtz would have no implied warranties of
merchantability or fitness for particular use.
the

plaintiff

would

have

no

recovery

It also provided that

for

his

incidental

consequential damages, but only the limited remedy provided.

or
The

limited warranty given provided that the seller would repair or replace
defects in materials and workmanship only.
Utah

Code

Annotated,

§70A-2-719(2)

provides

that

"where

circumstances cause a limited warranty to fail in its essential
purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this act".

This refers to

the

of

incidental

and

consequential

Annotated, §70A-2-715.

damage

remedies

Utah

Code

In this case, the essential purpose of the

limited warranty was to provide Mr. Schurtz a car to enjoy and drive.
The defendants failure to repair or replace defects in the car which
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impaired Mr. Schurtz's ability to enjoy or drive the car.

At this

point, the limited warranty had failed in its essential purpose.
After one-half day of uncontroverted testimony by plaintiffappellant, to the effect that respondent utterly failed or refused to
replace or repair the sustained defects in his car, the lower court
granted partial summary judgment against plaintiff, stating that he was
not entitled to incidental and consequential damages as a matter of
law.
Judge Noel's decision is clearly is contrary to the case law
interpreting §70A-2-719(2) as augmented by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act.
ISSUE II:

In this case, as in many of the Magnuson-Moss cases

concerning new car warranties, the plaintiff's attorney's fees exceeded
the value of the car by the time of trial.

Plaintiff's claim for

attorney's fees was $44,069.15. The attorney's fees issue was not only
a material issue as described in the Boyer and LeGrand Johnson cases,
but the most important issue decided.
The court's published findings based on its minute entry are
circular and lacking in detail.
the failure to settle was.

The findings do not tell whose fault

The findings do not say where, when, or

based upon what event the case should have settled. The findings imply
that the case should have settled when plaintiff's attorneys' fees
totaled the sum of $10,000.00.

The findings do not state when that

was, or how it determined that the plaintiff's attorney's fees were
ten thousand dollars at any given point in time.
ISSUE III:

The court's finding that the case could have or

should have settled earlier when the plaintiff's attorney's fees were
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only $10,000 is unsupported by the record.

In this case, the record

shows only that the hours spent by plaintiff's counsel were reasonably
necessary to its prosecution, that $90.00 per hour was a reasonable
rate for both of plaintiff's counsel to charge, and that the plaintiff
wanted to settle the case all along.
The record shows that the parties were not close in their
attempts to settle at any time. The record also shows that the parties
thought they had settled at one point, but that the plaintiff did not
understand or authorize the settlement.

The record on fees, taken as

a whole, paints a picture indicating that the defendants, from the
outset, wanted to settle the case on simple recision, paying a minimal
amount or nothing for attorney's fees and incidental and consequential
damages.

The plaintiff, on the other hand, believed in his cause of

action and that he was entitled to revoke acceptance of the car, his
incidental and consequential damages, and his attorney's fees.
The record does not identify or even suggest any episode, event,
or offer made by either side which plaintiff should have accepted, or
which should have caused him to settle.

Nothing in the transcript

concerning fees explains the district court's discounting the award of
attorney's fees, even if taken in a light most favorable to the lower
court.
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ARGUMENT
ISSUE I
DID THE DISTRICT COURT BELOW COMMIT ERROR OF
LAW IN GRANTING THE RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING APPELLANT ANY
RECOVERY ON HIS CAUSES OF ACTION FOR INCIDENTAL
AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES?
The parties agreed at trial that they were in dispute over
material facts concerning the incidental and consequential damages
issue.

Judge Noel ruled that the appellant was not entitled to these

damages as a matter of law. Mr. Schurtz was entitled to consequential
and incidental damages;

therefore, the trial court erred in granting

partial summary judgment.
Mr. Schurtz had purchased a new 1982 BMW motor car from the
defendant, BMW of Murray.

The vehicle came with a written new car

limited warranty.
The Magnuson-Moss Consumer Products Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. 2301
et seq, (the "Act") provides federal minimum standards for consumer
product warranties of two types:
"limited warranties".

1) "full warranties"; and, 2)

This case does not involve a full warranty,

therefore, this brief will not discuss full warranties.

Concerning

limited warranties, however, the Act eliminates a supplier's ability
to disclaim or modify implied warranties such as the warranties of
merchantability or fitness for a particular use.

15 U.S.C. 2308(a)(b)

Any disclaimer, modification or limitation, other than for the duration
of implied warranties is "ineffective for purposes of [the Act] and
state law".

11 U.S.C. 2308fc)

The effect of the Act is to encompass many UCC provisions and
to

expand

the

applicability

of
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those

provisions

by

preventing

disclaimer, modification or limitation of the UCC in cases where a
written warranty (in this case, a limited written warranty) exists.
In order to effectively raise a cause of action under the Act, it is,
therefore, necessary to rely on and plead elements which appear to be
UCC implied warranty claims.
It is possible for a cause of action for breach of warranty
under the Act to be separate and independent from a cause of action for
breach of an express warranty under the UCC.

The difference between

an action under the Act and a similar action under the UCC lies in the
expanded interpretation given to UCC provisions under the Act. The Act
expands the UCC and expressly overrides much of the case law limiting
UCC remedies.
Utah Code Annotated, §70a-2-719(2), 1953 as amended, provides:
Where circumstances cause an exclusive or
limited remedy to fail of its essential
purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this
act.
This provision gives appellant, upon failure of either (1) an exclusive
remedy; or, (2) a limited remedy, all of the remedies provided in the
U.C.C., including the incidental and consequential damages as described
in Utah Code Annotated, §70A-2-715, not "other remedies".
Under the limited warranty provisions provided by BMW to the
plaintiff, there is a limitation which eliminated implied warranties
and permits no recovery of incidental and consequential damages. This
makes the remaining warranty to repair or replace an exclusive as well
as a limited remedy. As argued before the district court below, if the
dealer and manufacturer are unable to "repair or replace" to cure the
defects, the exclusive remedy fails of its essential purpose.

If, as

argued by respondents, the effect of §70A~2-719(2) does not restore a
13

buyer1s right to claim incidental and consequential damages, then the
remedy which is restored is the very one which has failed, leaving the
buyer with no remedy at all. The factual dispute as to whether or not
Mr. Schurtz had given the defendants adequate opportunity to repair or
replace the vehicle in twenty attempts to do so was never decided.
Judge Noel granted partial summary judgment as a matter of law, halfway through plaintifffs testimony.
The purpose of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, as it applies to
new car purchases, is to expand the applicability of U.C.C. provisions
by preventing disclaimer, modification or limitation of the U.C.C. in
cases where a written warranty exists.

Cases under the Magnuson-Moss

Act provide for wide ranging damages for breach of warranty and for
recovery of litigation costs, including attorney's fees.

The cases

under Magnuson-Moss have been generous in awarding a broad range of
incidental and consequential damages.

Orange Motors v. Dade County

Dairies. Inc., 258 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1979);

Arnold v. Ford Motor Co.,

566 P.2d 98 (N.M. 1977)(award of purely economic losses); McGregor v.
Dimou, 422 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1979)(economic losses awarded);

Bolens v.

Redman Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058 (5th Circ. 1984)(award of damages for
lost investment and for costs of finding alternative housing);

Givan

v. Mack Truck, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 243 (Mo.App. 1978)(buyer awarded outof-pocket expenses, including hotel bill);

B&M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan,

376 So.2d 667 (Ala. 1979)(buyer's damage award included damages for
mental anguish);

Lemaldi v. DeTomasco of America. Inc.. 383 A.2d 1220

(N.J. 1978)(another mental anguish award); McGrady v. Chrysler Motors
Corp..

360

N.E.2d

818

(Ill.App.

1977)(damages

inconvenience, aggravation and loss of use);
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awarded

for

Coyle Chevrolet v.

Carrier, 397 N.E.2d 1283 (Ind.App. 1979)(damages awarded of sales tax
and finance charges);

Jacobs v. Rosemont Dodge-Winnebago South. 310

N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981)(damages for costs of substitute transportation);
Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 513 (Wis. 1978)(damages or
loss of use);

McGinnis v. Wentworth Chevrolet Co., 645 P.2d 543

(Or.App. 1982)(award of incidental costs, including storage expenses,
interest on loan financing and provision of substitute transportation) .
All of the above cases deal with application of Magnuson-Moss
Act and the U.C.C. to warranties for motor vehicles.
by the defendant
appellant

The cases cited

in their motion for summary judgment and which

anticipates

will

be

cited

in

defendants

brief,

are

distinguishable in that thev do not deal with warranties for motor
vehicles under Magnuson-Moss.
The Uniform Commercial Code, §2-719, Official Comment, states
in part:
Thus any clause purporting to modify or limit
the remedial provisions of this Article in an
unconscionable manner is subject to deletion
and in that event the remedies made available
by this Article are applicable as if the
stricken clause never existed.
Similarly,
under subsection (2), where an apparently fair
and reasonable clause because of circumstances
fails in its essential purpose or operates to
deprive either party of the substantial value
of the bargain, it must give way to the general
remedy provisions of this Article. [Emphasis
added.]
The incidental and consequential damage provisions of U.C.C. §2-715 are
reinstated if either (1) the limitation is unconscionable; or (2) the
warranty fails in its essential purpose or deprives either party of the
substantial value of the bargain.
This restoration of "general remedy provisions" applies to all
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of the U.C.C. damage provisions. Osburn v. Bendix Home Systems, Inc.
613 P.2d

445

(Okla. 1980).

consequential damages.
513, 525 (Wis. 1978).

This includes the right to recover

Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 265 N.W.2d
The Ohio supreme court held that an automobile

buyer may recover consequential damages when the seller has breached
an express warranty, even though the warranty denies recovery of those
damages. Goddard v. General Motors Corp., 396 N.E.2d 761 (Ohio 1979).
If the limitation on incidental and consequential damages is
permitted to stand where the warranty otherwise fails of its essential
purpose, the buyer is restored only to the remedy which has already
failed, i.e., to repair or replace.

The buyer, therefore, becomes

locked into a circle binding him to the exclusive remedy which is no
remedy.

This cannot reasonably be assumed to be the intent of the

Uniform Commercial Code, nor does it agree with the underlying purposes
of the Magnuson-Moss Act.
The only reasonable interpretation of Utah Code Annotated, §70A2-719 is that where the buyer has been deprived of the benefits of his
exclusive or limited remedy, he is entitled to all of the other
remedies available under the U.C.C.

These include incidental and

consequential damages. Therefore, the district court erred in granting
summary judgment

on the question of incidental and consequential

damages.

16

ISSUE II
DID THE LOWER COURT COMMIT ERROR OF LAW IN
MAKING FINDINGS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ITS
DECISION TO AWARD THE APPELLANT LESS THAN HIS
FULL CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES?
At the end of the presentation of evidence at trial, Judge Frank
Noel took the issue concerning attorney's fees under advisement.
Subsequently, the court rendered its decision in memorandum form via
minute entry dated August 9th, 1988 (Addendum E.) The court's findings
were adopted virtually verbatim into the written findings of fact,
conclusions of law and order prepared for the court, which it later
signed.

The court's findings were as follows:
"The court having taken under advisement the
issue of attorney's fees after testimony and
oral argument, now rules as follows: After
reviewing the evidence in this matter the court
is of the opinion that this case could have and
probably should have been settled very early
in the proceedings, for an amount roughly equal
to the ultimate outcome.
The court is,
therefore, not persuaded to grant [plaintiff]
all [attorney's] fees claimed but will make a
substantial discount based on what the court
feels is reasonable under the circumstances and
will award [plaintiff] $10,000 in attorney's
fees."

The court's finding, as outlined above, is insufficient and does not
meet the requirements of Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 52 requires that "the court shall find the facts specially". The
case law interpreting Rule 52, requires that "the trial judge in
contested cases find facts on all of the material issues, and that to
fail to do so is reversible error". Bover Co. v. Licrnell. 567 P.2d 1112
(Utah 1977) and LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson. 420 P.2d 615 (1966).
This case was vigorously defended.

Mr. Schurtz was deposed on

three separate days, and his deposition consists of four volumes.
17

Additionally, multiple sets of interrogatories and requests for the
production of documents were sent by defendants.

By the time the

matter came to trial, as is the case in many Magnuson-Moss cases, the
attorney's fees of the plaintiff were far in excess of the value of the
vehicle involved.

Universal Motors. Inc. v. Waldock 719 P.2d 254

(Alaska 1986) [$20,000.00 for the car, $65,000.00 for expert witness
fees, $36,526 in attorneys fees] and under an act similar to MagnusonMoss in Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc.. 578 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1978)
[attorney's fees in the amount of $14,000.00 we awarded where damages
amounted to only $3,690.00]
The
$14,500.00.

vehicle
His

Mr.

Schurtz

incidental

approximately $15,000.00.

bought
and

had

a purchase

consequential

claim

price of
was

for

By the time the matter got to trial, Mr.

Schurtz had accumulated attorney's fees in the amount of $44,069.15.
Attorney's fees, therefore, became a substantial issue.
The finding made by Judge Noel tells this court nothing about
what specific evidence he found to be credible. The finding says that
$10,000.00 in attorney's fees is "reasonable under the circumstances",
but does not say what the court found to be the circumstances.

It

states that the court's opinion is that the case "could have and
probably should have been settled very early in the proceedings", but
does not state why, when or for what amount. The finding is circular.
Without stating why the case should have settled or when, or that it
was the fault of the plaintiff that it had failed to settle, Judge Noel
says that case should have settled for an amount roughly equal to the
ultimate outcome.

Because the court awarded a discounted amount in

attorney's fees in the sum of $10,000.00, one can only assume that the
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court believed that the matter should have settled when the plaintifffs
attorney's fees equaled $10,000.00. The finding does not identify when
that was, or what episode, event or offer of settlement was made which
should have terminated the case. There is no finding that a settlement
offer was

ever made by

either

side, or why

it

should

have been

accepted.

Undisputed testimony at the time of trial was that only one

settlement offer was ever made with enough detail and authority that
the other side could have accepted it.

This settlement offer was the

subject of a motion by defendants to enforce, which the court denied.
(See Addendum D.)
The court fails to identify any other event, chain of events,
attitude or behavior which prevented the case from settling, when it
otherwise should have.

From the way the minute entry is written, it

appears to the appellant that the court decided to give him one-fourth
of his attorney's fees expended ($10,000.00) and then working backward
from that point, attempted to explain why.
Appellant asserts that the findings the lower court made should
have included

specific

facts concerning

such a substantial

issue.

Facts as described in this court's recent decision in the matter of
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 94 Utah Adv.Rpts. 3, 5 (Utah 1988) citing
Associated Industrial Development, Inc. v. Jewkes. 701 P.2d 486 (Utah
1984).

In these cases, the court set forth "practical guidelines" for

the determination

of reasonable

attorney's

fees,

and

listed

factors to be considered:
(1) what legal work was actually performed;
(2) how much work was reasonably necessary to adequately
prosecute the matter;
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four

(3) if the attorneys billing rate is consistent with the rates
customarily charged in the locality for similar services;
and
(4) those additional circumstances which require consideration,
or other additional factors which would warrant a
modification or alteration of the fees claimed, including
those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Appellant believes that the court should have made findings on each of
these important points.
The issues contained in the second guideline referred to above
were the most important and relevant question the court had to consider
in deciding the attorneyfs fees question.

The court made no finding

as to how much work was reasonably necessary to prosecute the matter
to

any

particular

point

in

the

litigation.

Instead,

the

court

obliquely states that the case probably should have settled at an early
stage, and never answers the question as to how much work would have
been necessary to prosecute the matter to that point.

It is difficult,

of course, to ascertain how much prosecution of the case was reasonably
necessary when we do not know what the court found to be the point at
which the case "probably should have settled".
The lower court

failed to make any finding

about the work

actually performed, what part of that work was necessary to prosecute
the matter and the reasonableness of the billing rate.

The court's

concurrent failure to make any specific findings concerning the fourth
factor outlined in the Dixie and Associated Industrial cases cited
above, about specifically why, for what, and when appellant should have
settled the matter at an earlier date, makes the courts

20

findings

concerning the substantial issue of attorney's fees in this case
inadequate.

Such failure is reversible error, as is stated in Dixie

and Associated, Therefore, the judgment concerning attorney's fees
should be reversed

and remanded to the lower court

for further

proceedings as are necessary to make an adequate finding.

ISSUE III
DID THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE CREDIBLE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED AT THE TIME OF TRIAL SUPPORT A
DECISION BY THE COURT BELOW TO DISCOUNT THE
ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARD?
The decision of the trial court below to discount the attorney's
fees is not supported by the preponderance of the evidence.

All of

the evidence on attorney's fees, even when taken in a light most
favorable to the court, still fails to support its ruling. Therefore,
the court's award of less than that claimed by appellant is in error.
Before one can decide if the finding is supported, one must
understand what the finding was. Reduced to its simplest terms, Judge
Noel's findings were that:
1.

The case could have settled;

2.

The

case

probably

should

have

settled

early

in the

proceedings;
3.

The case probably should have settled when plaintiff's fees

were $10,000.00.

(The record identifies no point in time where

plaintiff's fees were equal to this sum, but this figure is the
••ultimate outcome" to which the court refers.)
4.

That the court was not persuaded to grant the plaintiff all

of his attorney's fees;
5.

That the court feels an award of $10,000.00 in attorney's
21

fees to the plaintiff is reasonable under the circumstances.

In

its decisions

in the case of Security

State

Bank v.

Broadhead. 734 P.2d 469 (Utah, 1987) and Scharf v. BMG Corp. 706 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), this court has instructed that an appellant who
claims the evidence does not support the ruling has the burden of
reciting all of the pertinent evidence.

Additionally, the appellant

must also show that in the preponderance of the evidence taken, and in
a light favorable to the lower court, that evidence still does not
support the decision.

In this matter, the lower court's finding on

attorney's fees goes entirely, and inadequately, to the settlement
issue.
The appellant recites below virtually all of the evidence on
attorney's fees.

The summary concentrates on the pertinent evidence,

going to the issue of whether or not the matter should have settled at
an earlier date.
In reviewing the summary below, please keep in mind Judge Noel's
findings, and that:
!•

Any case can settle;

2.

Judge Noel indicated that this case probably should have

settled early in the proceedings, but the record does not shed any
light on when, where, why or under what circumstances;
3.

The record does not identify any point

and,
in time when

plaintiff's attorney's fees were $10,000.00, or any offer to settle by
either party,including a $10,000.00 attorney's fee component.
Earlier

in the trial, defendants had

sitpulated

that the

plaintiff could be teaeted as the prevailing party for the purpose of

22

attorneyfs fees. The plaintiff would not have accepted the defendant's
offer to take the car back losing his opportunity to present evidence
of breech of contract to the jury, without the defendant's agreement
to treat him as the prevailing party.

(See Transcript of proceedings,

pages 108-110.)

SUMMARY OF THE RECORD CONCERNING ATTORNEY'S FEES
After the court announced that it would grant the defendant's
motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of incidental and
consequential damages, counsel for plaintiff indicated that respondent
would concede that Mr. Schurtz could be treated as the prevailing party
for the purpose of the attorney's fees issue, in return for the
agreement

stated

on the record

concerning

the treatment

of the

revocation of acceptance issue.
The appellant called John Baird who Jiad served earlier as
appellant's counsel to the stand.

Mr. Baird testified that he had

formerly represented the appellant, Mr. Schurtz,

and in support of an

Exhibit identified as "Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 51" which was a summary
of Mr. Baird's billing during the course of his representation of Mr.
Schurtz4, Mr. Baird testified that Exhibit No. 51 was complete5 and
that he began representing the plaintiff in the summer of 19836. Mr.

1
2
3
4
5
6

transcript, page 110
transcript, page 113
transcript page 114, line 3
transcript, page 114,line 10
transcript, page 114, line 23
transcript, page 114, line 25
23

Baird further indicated that he ceased to represent him in March,
19877.
Mr. Baird testified that he had attended numerous depositions
of Mr. Schurtz8 and had responded to a great deal of written discovery
submitted by defendant as well9.

Mr. Baird further testified that he

filed the original complaint in the matter10, engaged in correspondence
with opposing counsel, both in writing and on the telephone

and

consulted with his own client, Mr. Schurtz, to a considerable extent12
and that he had done research in support of his client's position

.

Mr. Baird testified that an hourly summary of his work was
included in Exhibit No. 51 1 4 and that all of the work that had been
performed on behalf of the appellant was necessary15.

He further

testified that a reasonable rate to be charged per hour by an attorney
of his experience before the bench and bar (10 years) was $90.00 per
hour16. He testified that he billed Mr. Schurtz $85.00 per hour during
part of the period of his representation of him, and $90.00 per hour
during the later part of his representation, all of which was reflected
17

in his billings and included in Exhibit No. 51

7

- transcript, page 115, line 2
- transcript, page 115, line 10
9
- transcript, page 115, line 11
10
- transcript, page 115, line 14
11
- transcript, page 115, line 16
12
- transcript, page 115, line 18
13
- transcript, page 115, line 21
14
- transcript, page 116, line 2
15
- transcript, page 116, line 11
16
- transcript, page 116, line 15
- transcript, page 116, line 15

8
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.

Mr. Baird testified that through the date of his testimony, Mr.
18

Schurtz had paid him the sum of $5,341.56

.

He also testified that

as of that date Mr. Schurtz owed him for work performed through March,
1987, an additional $24,862.5919.
Appellantfs counsel moved for the admission of Exhibit Nos. 51
20

and 52 into evidence. Exhibit No. 52 was admitted

. After objections

and qualifications that the evidence would be admitted for illustrative
purposes only, Exhibit No. 51, being a detailed summary of Mr. Baird's
21

billings to the plaintiff, was also admitted

.

Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. McPhie, finished his examination of Mr.
Baird on direct examination and Mr. Stevens began cross-examination.
Some

extended

argument

was

made

to

the

court

concerning

applicability of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 408

.

the

After some

discussion which consumes roughly five pages of transcript, the court
ruled that evidence would be allowed concerning the efforts of the
respective parties to settle, but that the court would not admit
information

containing

specific

amounts

of

money

offered

in

23
settlement.
On cross-examination subsequent to the Rule 408 question, Mr.
Baird testified that his billings showed that the appellant had been
billed for a discussion of settlement on January 23rd, 198524. Mr.
transcript,
page
116,
23
Baird 18further
testified
that
theline
complaint
in this matter was first
19
transcript, page 117, line 1
20
transcript, page 117, line 24
21
transcript, page 120, line 4
22
transcript, page 127, line 19
23
transcript, page 127, line 18
24
transcript, page 127, line 21
25

filed in federal court and later re-filed in the state court after
plaintiff entered into a stipulation for dismissal in the federal court
25

based on jurisdictional defects

.

On cross-examination, Mr. Baird continued to testify that he
remembered a conversation with opposing counsel early in the case,
either just before or just after filing in state court, concerning
settlement.26

Mr. Baird was asked by counsel for defendant if he

remembered and early conversation made just after the complaint had
been refiled in the state court.

He was asked if whether he would

characterize that discussion as a recision-based offer of settlement.
Mr. Baird responded that he remembered the call, remembered Mr. Stevens
coming to his office and remembered that Mr. Stevens expressed the
possibility of a willingness on the part of his client to entertain an
offer of settlement.

Mr. Baird testified that there was a discussion

concerning revocation of acceptance, the expenses of maintaining the
28

automobile and attorney's fees incurred by the appellant. ° Mr. Baird
further stated that he remembered specifically a discussion of the
plaintiff's costs to that point, his consequential damages and his
29

attorney's

fees.

Mr. Stevens then asked him

again on cross-

examination if he remembered respondent making a specific, recisionbased offer,30 and Mr. Baird testified that he did not remember such
an offer being made.
25
transcript,
26
transcript,
27
transcript,
28
transcript,
29
transcript,
30
transcript,
31
transcript,

Mr.
page
page
page
page
page
page
page

Baird went on to testify that he remembered
128, lines 4-16
128, line 20
129, line 4
129, line 9
130, page 4
130, line 13
130, line 15

26

the discussion of the possibility of an offer being made by respondent,
32
but had no recollection of an offer being made.
Mr. Stevens then questioned Mr. Baird as to whether or not the
appellant had, during the course of his representation of him, ever
33
been made a specific recision-based offer.

Mr. Baird responded and

said "yes" and indicated that later in the proceedings there was a
^ A

written settlement offer made,

and Mr. Stevens asked which dates that

3R

offer was made.

Mr. Baird responded that it was contained in
36

correspondence from the defendants dated August 22nd, 1986.

Mr.

Baird testified that he later received a letter from defendants
explaining that they had not intended the August 22nd correspondence
to be an offer, and that defendant's counsel did not have the authority
to settle.
Mr. Stevens then asked Mr. Baird whether there had been any
settlement discussion between appellant and respondent between the
first settlement discussion he identified and the correspondence of
37

August, 1986.

Mr. Baird initially indicated that he showed some

discussion of settlement of January 24th, 1985, but later clarified
38

that it was a discussion with his own client.

Mr. Stevens then asked

Mr. Baird if any of his records showed any settlement discussions in
39
32
transcript,
page 130, line 18
January
1986 , and Mr. Baird responded by indicating that his
33 oftranscript,
page 130, line 21
34
transcript, page 130, line 23
35
transcript, page 131, line 3
36
transcript, page 131, line 7
37
transcript,page 131, line 11
38
transcript, page 131, line 16
39
transcript, page 131, line 22
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billing records showed no settlement discussions at that time. ° Mr.
Stevens then asked if the billing records showed any settlement efforts
on or about March 31st, 1986,41 and Mr. Baird indicated that his
records did not show that, but that in a discussion with his own
client, some settlement figures were prepared on March 3rd, 1986. Mr.
Baird further guessed that some settlement discussion with opposing
counsel was probably held in connection with the March 3rd work-up of
A. O

figures with his client.
Mr. Stevens then directed Mr. Bairdfs attention to the July
29th, 1986 billing statement (Exhibit No. 51) .

Mr. Baird indicated

that that billing statement showed an entry for negotiations with
opposing counsel for settlement.

Mr. Stevens then asked if there

were settlement negotiations on August 18th, 1986 again,

and Mr.

Baird indicated that there were, by letter.45 Mr. Stevens asked if his
records showed any settlement discussions on September 9th, 1986,

and

Mr. Baird indicated that his records showed a telephone call about
settlement.
Mr. Stevens then asked Mr. Baird to direct his attention to his
February,

1987 entry

in the billing

record

(Exhibit No.

51) 4 8 ,

whereupon Mr. Baird read the entry from his billing of that date.49
- transcript, page 132, line 1
41
42

44
45

-

transcript,
transcript,
transcript,
transcript,
transcript,
transcript,

page
page
page
page
page
page

132,
132,
132,
132,
132,
133,

line
line
line
line
line
line

5
8
13
22
25
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- transcript, page 133, line 4
48
49

- transcript, page 133, line
28 10
- transcript, page 133, line 18

Mr. Bairdfs recitation was as follows:
"The entry reads 'prepare settlement negotiations
with opposing counsel; preparation of letter of
confirmation; telephone call to the Supreme Court;
review of settlement letters; telephone call to
Scott Young1 who is your associate fdictate followup letter; hand deliver letter to Scott Young and
Pat Casey; cancel court reporter1".
Mr. Stevens then asked if the February 18th letter referred to a letter
of confirmation

and Mr. Baird stated that it did.

Mr. Stevens

52

asked what the letter was

and Mr. Baird responded that it was a

letter in regard to a written offer of settlement.
Mr. Stevens then asked Mr. Baird if the complaint filed in the
matter had contained multiple causes of action.
.

.

that the complaint contained six causes of action.

Mr. Baird answered
54

Mr. Stevens then

.

55

asked if the complaint contained counts for fraud.
answered in the affirmative.
count had survived.

Mr. Baird

Mr. Stevens then asked if the fraud

Mr. Baird answered that they had been dismissed
58

to the best of his recollection.

Mr. Stevens then asked if the

complaint had asked for punitive damages.
it had.

55

Mr. Stevens then asked if the request for punitive damages
-

transcript,
transcript,
transcript,
transcript,
transcript,
transcript,
transcript,

page
page
page
page
page
page
page

137,
137,
137,
141,
141,
141,
141,

line
line
line
line
line
line
line

2
5
8
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17
22
24
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58
59
60

Mr. Baird testified that

- transcript, page 141, line 25
- transcript, page 142, line 1
- transcript, page 142, line 3
- transcript, page 142, line 5
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had survived**1 and Mr. Baird explained that the punitive damages were
the remedies requested based on the fraud cause of action and that when
the fraud cause was dismissed, the request for punitive damages was
62

dismissed with them.
Mr. Stevens then asked Mr. Baird if Mr. Schurtz had always
wanted a settlement which included more than simple recision of the
contract.

Mr. Baird then answered the question, stating that Mr.

Stevens1 statement was accurate.

Counsel then asked Mr. Baird if Mr.
63

Schurtz had wanted punitive damages.

Mr. Baird responded that Mr.

Schurtz believed that there had been a fraud committed against him,
that punitive damages were the appropriate remedy for fraud, and that
they had been requested.
Mr. Baird was then taken on re-direct examination by Mr. McPhie
and asked if the settlement discussions with respondents counsel about
which he had previously testified had had specific dollar amounts
included.

Mr.

Baird

responded

that

dollar

amounts

had been

discussed, but that for the bulk of the conversations, dollars amounts
were upon categories of damages and not specific offers or counteroffers to settle.

He continued to indicate that on occasion when it

appeared possible to both sides that settlement could take place,
specific amounts were offered back and forth.

Mr. Baird was then

asked by counsel how many times respondent offered the plaintiff a
specific dollar amount settlement package, either orally or in writing,
61
62
63
64
65

transcript,
transcript,
transcript,
transcript,
transcript,

page
page
page
page
page

142,
142,
143,
147,
147,

line
line
line
line
line
30

6
7
9
18
24

made with the authority to settle and which could have been accepted.
Mr. Stevens objected to the question as being compound, and the court
overruled.

Mr. Baird then answered the question, indicating that he
67

did not recall any instance.

Appellantfs counsel then asked Mr.

Baird how it was that dollar amounts had been discussed, and yet no
68

offer had been conveyed which could have been accepted.
69
responded as follows:
"The spirit of it was that in fact both sides
were
interested
in
settling,
but
the
discussions were again — for the most part
never dealt with specific offers or counter
offers from either side. We were attempting
to settle the case from the outset. And I
believe that BMW was interest in settling the
case from the outset. I believe that because
of the communications that were made to me from
opposing counsel at that time, we were
interested.
We were taking initiative to
attempt to settle the case as well. Most of
the discussions centered on actual amounts that
would be acceptable to the parties in terms of
how damages would breakdown, fees incurred,
etc.
I never did have the understanding that we were
dealing with anything that opposing counsel had
authority from his client to — a specific
amount that his client had offered, authorized
him to offer in settlement of the case.
And at one point I believe that I did have that
understanding and expressed my concern, when
in fact it did not occur and subsequently
received — expressed my concern to opposing
counsel, and then received a letter clarifying
the issue that, no, he did not communicate to
me that he had authority from his client to
settle the case, and that he did not, but he
was pursuing the possibility of settlement.11

66
67
68
69

transcript,
transcript,
transcript,
transcript,

page
page
page
page
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148,
148,
149,

line
line
line
line
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Mr. Baird

The court then asked when that was. 70

Mr. Baird responded that it was

the letter he had previously identified from the billings as being a
written correspondence

concerning

settlement, dated August 22nd,

1986.71 The letter of August 22nd, 1986, described by Mr. Baird in his
testimony was then marked as Exhibit No. 62 and shown to Mr. Baird for
identification, which he did identify.72
Mr. Baird was then asked on re-direct if lie believed that the
allegations contained in the complaint filed on behalf of his client
in the state court were plead in good faith.
that he did. 74

Mr. Baird responded

Appellantfs counsel then asked Mr. Baird if the

appellant had believed, in good faith, that he had good causes of
action against the defendant which were outlined in the complaint75
76

and Mr. Baird responded "yes".

Mr. Baird was further asked if he

believed that the causes of action which were pled in the complaint
.

77
11

were pled in good faith, to which he responded "yes .
Appellant's counsel then asked Mr. Baird:
11
You have indicated that Mr. Schurtz wanted,
throughout this matter, a recovery that went
beyond purely return of the vehicle and the
refund of his .purchase price. What in addition
did he want?"78
Mr. Baird replied:
"The relief that was prayed
70

- transcript, page 150, line 4
- transcript, page 150, line 6

72

'
73
74

- transcript, page 150, line 13
- transcript, page 152, line 2
- transcript, page 152, line 3

75

7

-

transcript,
transcript,
transcript,
transcript,

page
page
page
page

152,
152,
152,
152,

line 6
line 7
lines 10-11
line
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for

involved

[compensatory] damages for the expenses of
keeping the car, following his effort to have
it repaired.
There was a loan that was
involved. There were payments and interest
expenses involved with respect to that loan
that financed the car. There were attorney's
fees accruing and ensuing, together with the
punitive .damages.
The car costs were
involved."79
Appellant then moved for admission of Exhibit No. 62 and it was,
80

over the objection of the respondent, received.
Mr. Stevens then took Mr. Baird on re-cross examination, asking
if he had intended his testimony to be as it was, that being to the
effect that no offer of settlement specific enough or with authority
81

to settle had been offered the appellant.

Mr. Baird answered that

the short answer to the question was "no", and that there had been no
offer made by the respondent which he felt was specific enough and was
with the authority to be accepted, other than the one made August 22nd,
82

1986 by letter.
recommended

Mr. Stevens then asked Mr. Baird if he had

to Mr. Schurtz

that he accept

the settlement

offer

83

reflected in a letter dated February, 1987.

Mr. Baird responded that

it did not occur in that way, explaining that it was not an offer from
respondent,

BMW,

which

was

being

considered

for

acceptance

or

rejection, but rather, was an offer that he had believed he had the
authority from Mr. Schurtz to make to the defendant.

Mr. Stevens

then asked if Mr. Baird had recommended that appellant make an offer
n Q
- transcript, page 152, line 23
80

- transcript, page 154, line 6
81
ox

-

transcript,
transcript,
transcript,
transcript,

page
page
page
page
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155,
156,
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line
line
line
line
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16
13
11
12

within a certain range of numbers
raised.

at which time an objection was

It was overruled and followed by a discussion of what Mr.

Baird's letter stated, what his intention in preparing the letter had
been, and concerning the frame of mind of both parties counsel at the
time the letter was written. This testimony can be best characterized
as confusing as to who had what authority, and who intended to make a
86
settlement offer and who did not.
Mr. Stevens asked what two amounts of money were being discussed
with regard to settlement at the time of the February, 1987 letter,
resulting in an objection concerning specific amounts under Rule 408,
87

which objection was overruled.

Mr. Baird then described what amounts

were attributed to recision value and what amounts were attributable
to settlement monies to be paid in other categories, in that February,
88

1987 letter.

Mr. Baird was then asked if he recalled any of that

discussion as being "background" to the settlement conversation taking
place in February, 1987.89 Mr. Baird answered in the affirmative. Mr.
Stevens then asked again as to specific price amount breakdowns in the
settlement discussions that took place, giving rise to an objection by
appellant's counsel,

which objection was overruled.

Mr. Stevens

asked again concerning the February, 1987 settlement discussions and
the specific numbers which had surfaced therein92
- transcript, page 156, line 17
86

- transcript, page 156, line 18
87

- transcript, page 158, lines 18-25

88 - transcript, page 159, line 11

1
- transcript, page 159, line 18
89 - transcript, page 160, line 3
- transcript, page 160, line 19
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and Mr. Baird

responded that the settlement discussion had been of the recision value
plus $3,000,00.93
(This is the offer for settlement Mr. Baird earlier testified
that he believed he had authority from his client to make, but which
the court refused to enforce on Mr. Schurtz after a full hearing on the
defendant's motion to enforce.)(See Addendum D.)
Appellant's counsel, David A. McPhie, then took the stand
94
concerning his fees in the case.

Appellant's counsel testified that

he was admitted to practice before the Supreme Court and had been an
attorney practicing in Salt Lake County for a period of ten years.95
He further testified that he commenced representing the appellant in
February, 1987, when his prior counsel, John Baird, had withdrawn96
and that he had performed work including research in connection with
resisting a motion by respondent's for enforcement of a settlement
agreement (the February, 1987 agreement), including drafting and re97

drafting memoranda of points and authorities.

Appellant's counsel

went on to testify that he appeared a second time with regard to the
enforcement hearing on objections to prepared orders, had conferences
both with the client and opposing counsel, had done research on the
Magnuson-Moss Act and the Uniform Commercial Code generally and review
of the appellant's ability to recover under the causes of action then
98

remaining before the court.
93
94
95
96
97
98

transcript,
transcript,
transcript,
transcript,
transcript,
transcript,
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page
page
page
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Mr. McPhie additionally testified that

160,
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line
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22
23
6
13
17
18

he had spent considerable time reviewing the depositions of Mr. Schurtz
which were in four volumes and taken over a period of three days and
reviewing all other discovery done, including interrogatories and
requests for production of documents. Additionally, counsel testified
that he had reviewed all of the correspondence and other pleadings in
the matter.
Counsel went on to testify that he had prepared a motion for a
protective

order

interrogatories;

with

regard

to

respondent's

third

set

of

had done research, prepared for, and successfully

resisted a motion by the respondent's to deny the appellant a jury
trial; and, had

additionally

witnesses, preparing

direct

prepared
and

for trial by

cross-examination

of

interviewing
anticipated

witnesses, compiling the documents to be presented to the court, and
appearing at trial.
Mr. McPhie further testified that he had expended between 155
and 200 hours between himself and another attorney named Paul Palmer,
who had done work in the case as a clerk in preparing the trial brief
and preparing jury instructions, and that Mr. Palmer's work had been
billed at the rate of $50.00 per hour.

Counsel testified that his

billing rate was $90.00 per hour and that it was a reasonable rate for
an attorney of his experience in this community.102

Appellant's

counsel testified concerning Exhibit No. 60, which he identified, and
indicated that the appellant had paid to him in attorney's fees the sum
of $9,000.00 prior to Exhibit No. 60 being compiled, and another

99
100
101
102

transcript, page 164, line 9
transcript, page 164, line 10
transcript, page 164, line 19
transcript, page 165, line 3
36

103

$2,000.00 subsequent to Exhibit No. 60 being compiled.

He further

testified that in addition to the $11,000.00 paid by appellant, an
additional

$1,065.00

was

owing

the

clerk,

Paul

Palmer,

and an

additional $1,800.00 for two days of trial, which were not included in
the billing.104
Mr. McPhie was then cross-examined by Mr. Stevens who reviewed
with him all discussions of settlement referred to in Exhibit No. 60 1 0 5
and asked if the billings showed any conference regarding settlement
on October 1st, 1987, to which Mr. McPhie responded "yes".1

6

Mr.

Stevens asked if there was an indication of a conference regarding
settlement on September 2nd, 1987 and Mr. McPhie responded in the
107

affirmative.

Mr. Stevens asked appellants counsel about October

16th, 1987 as to a settlement discussion and counsel testified that
there was.

Mr. Stevens went on to ask if appellant's counsel had

prepared a settlement offer.

Mr. McPhie responded that he had mailed

a settlement proposal in the form of a letter about that time.

Mr.

Stevens asked Mr. McPhie concerning his billing of April 1st, 1988, and
whether or not it referred to a March 10th billing discussing a
settlement

conference with "Young", to which appellant's counsel

indicated he saw such an indication in the billing statement.109

Mr.

Stevens then asked if there was a billing in the appellant's billing
statement for July 19th, 1988 to which appellant's counsel responded
103
10
105
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Yes, I remember that occasion specifically."110

asked

Mr.

McPhie

if

that

he

remembered

occasion

and

speaking

Mr. McPhie

Mr. Stevens then
about

settlement

specifically

on

responded

in the

affirmative.

Mr. Stevens then asked Mr. McPhie if he remembered a

discussion on approximately July 7th, 1988. Mr. McPhie again affirmed
that there was an entry in his billing record which showed "preparation
for a settlement conference with defendant's counsel".
Mr. Stevens then asked if, in any of the settlement discussions
between himself and the witness, Mr. McPhie, whether an offer had been
made on behalf of appellant for settlement, based on recision alone,
or whether the settlement offers were made based on some recompense for
112
additional damages appellant had alleged.
Mr. McPhiefs response
was:
"In all of our — let me answer your question
directly first. Our discussions in the month
of July, 1988, as referred to, were discussions
in which I indicated to you that I believed my
client might settle, and that I anticipated
some difficulty in selling him on the
proposition for certain amounts of money. And
that those amounts of money, the totals were
made up of amounts for revocation, minus a fair
amount of money to compensate BMW for miles
against the purchase price and return, and for
incidental and consequential damages we
believed plaintiff was entitled to recover, and
a component for attorney's fees. And I, as I
recall, it was soliciting from BMW an offer and
response to my statements concerning what I
believed my client would take without
discussing it with him."
Respondent's counsel then asked if every offer made by appellant
through his then counsel, McPhie, had included a component requesting

110
1

- transcript, page 168, line 18
- transcript, page 169, line 7

112

- transcript, page 169, line 20
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amounts

of

money

for

incidental

and

consequential

damages

and

attorney's fees, beyond the price agreed to for the revocation, and
appellant's counsel agreed that was correct. 113
Mr. Stevens then indicated that he had no further questions for
Mr. McPhie on cross, whereupon, Mr. McPhie testified as follows:
"I would like to indicate that in the
references to the dates on which billings were
made for settlement discussions, there have
only been two to three real settlement
discussions of substance, in my view.
Shortly after the time this court denied the
motion for enforcement of what was a previous
settlement agreement, there was an exploration
as to whether this matter could be settled
without having to gear back up for an
anticipated trial.
It was clear from those discussions that the
defendants would not or could not offer any
amount of money which would substantially
reimburse Mr. Schurtz for his attorney's fees.
And therefore settlement negotiations, I
believe, were thought on both sides to be at
an impasse.
The intervening conversations before July of
this year were casual references to a general
desire to settle this matter, and no specifics
were discussed.
The only other settlement
discussions of substance have been in July,
last month, as both sides prepared for trial.
And again, settlement negotiations have broken
down when we have pursued the recovery of what
Mr. Schurtz believed he should have gotten in
incidental and consequential damages and
attorney's fees." 114
On re-cross, Mr. Stevens asked Mr. McPhie if the settlement
offer made by plaintiff shortly after the court's ruling to not enforce
a previous settlement agreement had been in the $80,000.00 range. Mr.

113
XA
114

- transcript, page 170, line 18
- transcript, page 172, line 1
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McPhie indicated that he could not remember, but that such a figure
would not surprise him. 115

Mr. Stevens then asked Mr. McPhie if

settlement discussions shortly before trial were to the effect that the
appellant still wanted many multiples of the recision value of the car
in full settlement for revocation, incidental and consequential damages
and attorneys fees, to which appellant's counsel replied "yes11.116
Appellant's counsel then offered Exhibit No. 60 of Mr. McPhie1s
detailed

listing

concerning billing,

into evidence, and opposing

counsel offered no objection.
[END OF EVIDENCE SUMMARY]

Hugh Schurtz was entitled to his attorney's fees. Magnuson-Moss
provides fees to the prevailing party under §15 USC 2310(d)(2), and it
had been stipulated that the plaintiff was the prevailing party. Mr.
Schurtz's evidence as to fees was straight-forward and to the point.
Both of plaintiff's counsel testified as to the time spent, the
necessity of the time spent, and a reasonable billing rate for that
time.

The unchallenged testimony was that plaintiff, in good faith,

pursued causes of action in which he believed.
The defendants never admitted breech of warranty and the jury
was released without making a finding.

It was obvious that the

defendants believed a jury would find breech of warranty, or they would
not have allowed the car to be returned for the purchase price, or
agreed to allow the plaintiff to be treated as the prevailing party

- transcript, page 173, line 16
- transcript, page 174,line 15
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for the purpose of attorney's fees.

The defendants avoided the

evidence which would have shown that the plaintiff suffered from their
breech of warranty and its effects, through defendants offer to take
the car back and designate plaintiff as the prevailing party.
When the plaintiff was forced to sue to obtain relief, he
brought his suit under the provisions of, and sought the relief
provided for, under Magnuson-Moss.

Those remedies include the right

to return the car and get back the purchase price (minus a fair amount
to compensate for actual miles driven), incidental and consequential
damages, and reasonable attorney's fees actually incurred.
The record outlined above shows no time, place or event where
the plaintiff had a chance to settle for what he believed were his just
damages and fees, or for a sum even close to those damages and fees.
The defendant called no witnesses.

There was no testimony explaining

what offer Mr. Schurtz should have accepted, or why. It was simply the
position of the defendants, that they had not breeched the warranty
(although they conceded the remedy for the breech) and that Mr. Schurtz
did not need the Magnuson-Moss remedies he prayed for and should have
settled early in the case for little, if anything, in the way of
incidental damages or fees. Again, this came from the defendants who
obviously agreed to a return of the vehicle and treating plaintiff as
the prevailing party, in order to avoid the continuing, damaging
testimony concerning breech of warranty.

The defendant never offered

anything for incidental and consequential damages.

The only offer on

which this court has any specific information was the one made in
February of 1987.

(See Transcript of Proceedings, page 117.)

It

contained a $3,000.00 component for attorney's fees. (Transcript, page
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118)

The plaintiff's fees by that time were more than $20,000.00.

(Transcript, page 119.)

In a later ruling the lower court refused to

enforce that settlement on the plaintiff.

(See Addendum D.)

The relationship of the attorney's fees to the amount in
controversy is also not a limiting factor. Other courts have permitted
generous awards of attorney's fees in Magnuson-Moss cases. Universal
Motors, Inc. v. Waldock, 719 P.2d 254 (Alaska 1986) (award of attorney's
fees of $36,526 where damage award was $20,000); Duval v. Midwest Auto
City, Inc., 578 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1978)(attorney's fees in excess of
$14,000 awarded where damages amounted to only $3,960). This court has
taken a similar posture that an award of attorney's fees can be greater
than the amount recovered and still be reasonable. Cabrera v. Cohrell,
694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985).
The only asserted basis for reduction of attorney's fees is the
unsupported conclusion by the trial court that the matter "could have
and probably should have" been settled earlier.

No evidence was

presented showing why plaintiff should have settled for less than the
value of his claim.

No evidence was presented that appellant was,

either based upon fact or law, unreasonable in pursuing the full value
of his claim.
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CONCLUSION
The district court below committed an error of law in granting
partial

summary

judgment

against

the plaintiff

on the

issue of

incidental and consequential damages.
The findings made by Judge Noel are inadequate to support his
decision to award plaintiff a reduced amount in attorney's fees.
The

record

made

at

trial

concerning

attorney's

fees and

settlement attempts, taken in a light most favorable to the lower
court, still does not support its findings concerning plaintiff's fees.
Hugh Schurtz, the plaintiff below and the appellant herein,
requests that this court reverse the judgment of the lower court and
remand the matter for trial on the issue of the amount of incidental
and consequential damages to be awarded him.

Appellant also requests

that this court reverse the lower court's order concerning attorney's
fees, and award him the attorney's fees requested at trial in the
amount of $44,069.15.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^

day of March, 1989.

l X < ^ A. A^>L
David A. McPhie
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of
the foregoing to attorney for defendants, Lewis T. Stevens, at 215 S.
State Street, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid,
on this <j%<? day of March, 1989,

A.A£&.

David A. McPhie
Attorney for Appellant
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I DAVID A. McPHIE, #2216
|| HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, BLAKESLEY & McPHIE
ii Attorney for Plaintiff
!! 3450 S. Highland Drive, Suite 301
j! Salt Lake City, Utah
84106
\[ Telephone: 484-7632
i|

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

I

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

! HUGH SCHURTZ,
}
jf
I v*

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
•

)'

J BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
CLARK BUICK-DATSUN-GMC-BMW,
I INC., BMW OF MURRAY, and DOES
1 through X,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil NO. C84-7463
Judge Frank G. Noel

THIS MATTER came on for trial on the 1st day of August, i
j

i

1988 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. before the Honorable Judge Frank j
G. Noel.

!

The plaintiff appeared personally and through his attorney j
of record, David A. McPhie.

The defendants appeared by and

through their attorney of record, Lewis T. Stevens.

I

A jury panel was interviewed and examined for cause and I
pre-emptry challenges were made.

A jury was impaneled and sworn

in to serve as a jury in the case.

j

Counsel made their opening statements, and the plaintiff
called his first witness, Hugh Schurtz, who was examined on
direct examination and who identified various pieces of physical
evidence in the form of documents, many of which were admitted i
into evidence.
J

I

Prior to the date of trial, defendants had made a motion j

for summary judgment, or in the alternative, for partial summary
j| judgment, requesting that all defendants warranty theories be
j| summarily dismissed, or in the alternative, that the plaintiff be
j! summarily denied

incidental and consequential damages.

This

jj motion for full or partial summary judgment had been heard on
July 22nd, 1988 at 10:00 a.m. and was taken and held under
advisement by the court.
I
On the morning of the second day of trial, the court •
I
called counsel into chambers and indicated that it denied j
defendants motion for summary judgment eliminating plaintifffs |
i

i

causes of action based on warranty, but granted

defendants j
i

motion

to

eliminate

f

plaintiff s

right

to

incidental

and !
!

consequential damages.

The court's decision was stated in open

court and on the record immediately thereafter.

j

In connection with said decision by the court, certain i
i

j stipulations were made by the parties on the record in open j
|court.

These stipulations were that:
A.

Although defendant did not concede the issues of

breach of warranty or breach of contract, a stipulation was
entered into to the effect that defendant would allow plaintiff
to return the subject vehicle to defendant, and that the purchase
price

of

$14,500.00

of

the

vehicle

would

be

refunded

to

plaintiff, minus a credit to the defendant for actual use by the
plaintiff in the amount of $0.16 per mile for 22,516 miles, for a
total credit of $3,602.56; and
B.

It was further stipulated that for purposes of the

attorney's fees argument, that plaintiff would be deemed the
prevailing party as is referred to in Section 15 U.S.C. 2310 of
li the United States Code, which is the attorney's fees provision of
the Manguson-Moss Warranty Act.
Having further decided, sua sponte, that the provisions of
Section 15 U.S.C. 2310 of the United States Code anticipates the
attorney's fees question in a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Case being
decided by the court, and not a jury, and all other jury issues
having been disposed of either by stipulation or by summary
judgment, the court dismissed the jury.
Plaintiff then called witnesses in support of plaintiff's
attorney's fees, namely, John Baird and David A. McPhie, who were
examined by counsel for both parties on direct, cross, re-direct
and re-cross.
Closing argument was made, and the court took the matter
of the issue of attorney's fees of plaintiff, the only remaining
issue, under advisement.
The

court

later published

its opinion

concerning the

attorney's fees issue, via minute entry dated August 9th, 1988.
Based
defendants,
consequential

upon

the

dismissing
damages,

partial

summary

plaintiff's

claim

and

the

judgment
for

stipulation

granted

incidental
of

the

and

parties

concerning return of the motor vehicle to the defendants and the
refund of the purchase price, minus $0.16

per mile for miles

driven, and the court's decision as contained in its minute entry
concerning attorney's fees, the court now makes the following

il
!i.

FINDINGS OF FACT
.

•

•

a

•j

1.

The court finds that the purchase price of the motor ,

ii

j

I vehicle was $14,500.00.

I

i

|l

2.

The court finds that the plaintiff drove the car

22,516 miles.
3.

The court further finds, based upon the stipulation

of the parties, that a reasonable amount to award defendant in j
i

credit for miles driven on the vehicle is the amount of $0.16 per j
(

mile.

J
4.

The court finds, with regard to attorney^ fees, that

this matter could have been, and probably should have been, j
settled very early in the proceedings, for an amount roughly j
i

equal to the ultimate outcome.
substantial

discount

appropriate.

of

the

The court further finds that a j
plaintifffs

attorneyfs

fees

is !

The court further finds that a reasonable amount in

attorney's fees to be awarded plaintiff under the circumstances
is the amount of $10,000.00.
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the court now
makes the following

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That plaintiff should be awarded judgment against

defendant in the amount of $10,897.44, and is ordered to return
the 1982 BMW model 320i motor vehicle, which is the subject of

this lawsuit, to the defendants in connection with the payment to
l

Ij plaintiff of said amount by defendant.
ji
ij

2.

present

Plaintiff should not be awarded, nor be entitled to ;

evidence

in support

of, his claim

for incidental

and j

consequential damages for breach of the warranty and/or contract |
of sale as is prayed for in the complaint.
3.

Plaintiff

against defendants

6hould b e awarded

in the amount

j
an additional

of $10,000.00

judgment

for attorney f s j

fees.

!
DATED this J?£> day of September, 1988.

Approved:

Lewis jr. Stevens
Attorney for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid, on this ^>* day
of August, 1988.
Lewis T. Stevens
Atty for BMW
215 S. State St., #500
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111

T. Patrick Casey
Attorney for Clark
r 185 S. State St., #700
1 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Deborah M. >P£1 ton,£<£
Secretary

j

DAVID A. McPHIE, #2216
HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, BLAKESLEY & McPHIE
Attorney for Plaintiff
3450 S. Highland Drive, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah
84106
Telephone: 484-7632
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j
!
j
j

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HUGH SCHURTZ,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

v.
Civil No. C84-7463
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
CLARK BUICK-DATSUN-GMC-BMW,
INC., BMW OF MURRAY, and DOES
through X,

Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendants.
THIS MATTER came on for trial on the 1st day of August, !
1988 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. before the Honorable Judge Frank j
G. Noel.

!
i

The plaintiff appeared personally and through his attorney
of record, David A. McPhie.

The defendants appeared by and

through their attorney of record# Lewis T. Stevens.
A jury panel was interviewed and examined for cause and
pre-emptry challenges were made.

A jury was impaneled and sworn

in to serve as the jury in the case.
Counsel made their opening statements, and the plaintiff
called his first witness, Hugh Schurtz, who was examined on
direct examination and who identified various pieces of physical
evidence in the form of documents, many of which were admitted
into evidence.
Prior to the date of trial, defendants made a motion for

summary judgment, or in the alternative, for partial summary
jj judgment, requesting that all defendants warranty theories be
;' summarily dismissed, or in the alternative, that the plaintiff be j
:, summarily

denied

incidental and consequential damages.

This

i.

motion for full or partial summary judgment had been heard on
July 22nd, 1988 at 10:00 a.m. and was taken and held under
advisement by the court.
On the morning of the second day of trial, the court
j called

counsel

into

chambers

and

indicated

that

it denied

I defendants motion for summary judgment eliminating plaintiff!s
i causes of action based on warranty, but granted
j motion

to

;

eliminate

j consequential damages.

plaintifffs

right

to

defendants

incidental

and

The courtfs decision was stated in open

court and on the record immediately thereafter.
In connection with said decision by the court, certain
stipulations were made by the parties on the record in open
court.

These stipulations were that:
A.

Although defendant did not concede the issues of

breach of warranty or breach of contract, a stipulation was
entered into to the effect that defendant would allow plaintiff
to return the subject motor vehicle to defendant, and that the
purchase price of $14,500.00 of the vehicle would be refunded to
plaintiff, minus a credit to the defendant for actual use by the
plaintiff in the amount of $0.16 per mile for 22,516 miles, for a
total credit of $3,602.56; and
B.

It was further stipulated that for purposes of the

attorneyfs fees argument, that plaintiff would be deemed the
j prevailing party as is referred to in Section 15 U.S.C. 2310, of
i the United States Code, which is the attorneyfs fees provision of
| the Manguson-Moss Warranty Act.
Having further decided, sua sponte, that the provisions of
Section 15 U.S.C. 2310 of the United States Code anticipates the
attorney's fees question in a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Case being
decided by the court and not a jury, and all other jury issues
having been disposed of either by stipulation or by summary
judgment, the court dismissed the jury.
Plaintiff then called witnesses in support of plaintiff's
attorney's fees, namely, John Baird and David A. McPhie, who were
examined by counsel for both parties on direct, cross, re-direct
and re-cross.
Closing argument was made, and the court took the matter
of the issue of attorney's fees of plaintiff, the only remaining
issue, under advisement.
The

court

later published

its opinion concerning the

attorney's fees issue, via minute entry dated August 9th, 1988.
Based
defendants,

upon

the

dismissing

consequential

damages,

partial

summary

plaintiff's

claim

and

the

judgment
for

stipulation

granted

incidental
of

the

and

parties

concerning return of the motor vehicle to the defendants and the
refund of the purchase price, minus $0.16

per mile for miles

driven, and the court's decision as contained in its minute entry
concerning

attorney's

fees, and

the court having previously

published its findings of fact and conclusions of law# now makes
the following order and judgment•

j

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

The plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment against the ;

defendants, and
2.

j

each of them,

Plaintiff

in the amount of $10,897.44. '

is ordered to return the subject motor I

vehicle, a 1982 BMW model 320i, to the defendant via such agent [
i

as defendant may direct, and that 6aid return of the vehicle by j
plaintiff to defendants and payment of the judgment referred to !
immediately

above

from

defendant

to

plaintiff

shall

occur I

simultaneously.
3.
defendants

Plaintiff
in

the

is

amount

awarded
of

further

$10,000.00

judgment

against j
i
in attorneyfs fees. !

&

'

u

DATED this ^ d a y of September, 1988.

i
i
i

Approved:
trudge/?:rank G. Noel
Lewis' T-i Stevens
Attorney for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
|
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of j
the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid, on this J2>£day !
of August, 1988.
i
Lewis T. Stevens
Atty for BMW
215 S. State St., #500
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111

T. Patrick Casey
Attorney for Clark
185 S. State St., #700
/ Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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BMW LIMITED WARRANTY
LIMITED WARRANTY
1982 MODELS
(Valid only in the U.S.A.)

R

BMW of North America, Inc. warrants this vehicle to be free of
defects In materials or workmanship for a period of 3 years or
36.000 miles, whichever occurs first, commencing with the
date the vehicle is first licensed or placed In service as a
"demonstrator" or -company car**. To obtain service under
this warranty, the vehicle must be brought, upon discovery
of the defect, to The workshop of any authorised BMW dealer.
This dealer will, without charge for parts or labor either repair
or replace the defective part(s). The decision to repair or
replace said part(s) being wholly the responsibility of BMW
of North America. Inc. Parts for which replacements are
made become the property of BMW of North America. Inc.
BMW of North America. Inc. makes no other express warranty
on this product except the warranty as to the emission
control system or the Limited Warranty - Rust Perforation.
THE DURATION OF ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING
THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY. IS
LIMITED TO THE DURATION OF THE EXPRESS WARRANTY
HEREIN. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, I N C HEREBY EXCLUDES INCIDENTAL AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES,
INCLUDING LOSS OF TIME, INCONVENIENCE, OR LOSS
OF USE OF THE VEHICLE, FOR ANY BREACH OF ANY
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY, INCLUOING THE
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, APPLICABLE
TO THIS PRODUCT. Some states do not allow limitations
on how long an implied warranty lasts, or the exclusion or
limitation of incidental or consequential damages, so the
above limitations and exclusions may not apply to you.
This warranty gives you specific legal rights, and you may also
have other rights which vary from state to state. Any legal
claim or actfon arising from any express or implied warranty
contained herein must be brought within 12 months of the
date it arises.
THE WARRANTY SHALL BE NULL AND VOID IF:
The vehicle is used in any competitive events.
THIS WARRANTY DOES NOT APPLY TO
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:
a. Maintenance services, oil changes, and filters
b. Incandescent bulbs and fuses
c. Wheel alignment and balancing
d. Brake linings and brake pads
e. Windshield wiper blades
f. V-belts
g. Mechanical adjustments or repairs which become necessary
through normal use. or wear and tear
h. Towing
f. Damage attributable to negligence. Improper treatment, or
treatment contrary to the "Owner's Handbook",
j. Damage occurring through corrosion resulting from road salt,
or Improper accident damage repairs,
k. Damage to a component or assembly due to the Installation
of replacement parts with specifications that differ In any
material respect from genuine BMW parts.
1. Damage attributable to failure to perform maintenance
services at the specified Intervals or In accordance with the
instructions In the "Owner's Manual". Proof must be provided
either by a paid invoice copy or filling In the appropriate
boxes In the service manual.
H m. Tires have a separate limited warranty from their respective
™
manufacturer.
n. Any vehicle on which the odometer has been replaced or
altered, and the true mileage cannot be determined.
E A S T E R N R E G I O N A L OFFICE
B M W OF NORTH A M E R I C A . I N C .
WALNUT STREET 4 H U D S O N AVENUE
N O R W O O D . NEW JERSEY 07S4S
W E S T E R N R E G I O N A L OFFICE
B M W OF N O R T H A M E R I C A . I N C .
12541 BEATRICE A V E N U E
F.O. BOX M 9 1 S . r - .

LIMITED WARRANTY - RUST PERFORATION - 1962 MODELS
BMW of North America. Inc.. warrants this vehicle to be free
of defects in materials or workmanship which will result ftn
rust perforation of the vehicle body for a period of 6 years,
without mileage limitation, commencing wtth the date the
vehicle Is first licensed or placed In service as a -demonstrator"
or "company car."
To obtain service under this warranty, the vehicle must be
brought, upon discovery of any rust perforation, to the workshop of any authorized BMW dealer. This dealer win, wttrxxrt
charge for parts or labor either tepak or replace the defective
part(s). The decision to repair or replace said partes) being
wholly the responsibility of BMW of North America, Inc.
Parts for which replacements are made become the property
of BMW of North America. Inc.
BMW of North America, Inc.. makes no other express
warranty on this product except the new car warranty or
the warranty as to the emission control system. THE OURATION
OF ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, IS LIMITED TO THE
DURATION OF THE EXPRESS WARRANTY HEREIN. BMW OF
NORTH AMERICA, I N C , HEREBY EXCLUDES INCIDENTAL
ANO CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, INCLUOING LOSS OF
TIME, INCONVENIENCE, OR LOSS OF USE OF THE
VEHICLE. FOR ANY BREACH OF ANY EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF MERCHANTABILITY. APPLICABLE TO THIS PRODUCT.
Some states do not allow limitations on how long an Implied
warranty lasts, or the exclusion or limitation of Incidental
or consequential damages, so the above limitations and
exclusions may not apply to you.
This warranty gives you specific legal rights, and you may I
also have other rights which vary from state to state. Any
legal claim or action arising from any express or Implied
warranty contained herein must be brought within 12 months
of the date it arises.
THIS WARRANTY DOES NOT APPLY TO THE FOLLOWING: j
a. Damage caused by negligence. Improper accident damage |
repairs, or improper use.
j
b. Damage attributable to failure to perform required Inspections/maintenance at the specified Intervals or In ;
accordance with the BMW rust Inspection/maintenance
program instructions. Proof must be provided by a paid
invoice or filling In the appropriate boxes In the Service
Manual.
REQUIRED MAINTENANCE:
In order to keep this warranty In effect, the vehicle must
be Inspected every 12th month, beginning at the end of the
first year of service. Any areas requiring preventive maintenance
must be repaired. (THIS INSPECTION/MAINTENANCE IS AT
THE OWNERS EXPENSE.)
The Inspection/Maintenance consists of:
a. Washing the chassis, before Inspection, If necessary doe
to dirt accumulation.
b. Repairing any damages to undercoatlng due to stone
chips, gravel erosion, scratches, or other external Influences.

CENTRAL REGIONAL OFFICE
B M W OF N O R T H A M E R I C A . I N C .
1003 C. A L G O N Q U I N R O A D
SCMAUM6URQ, ILLINOIS §01*9
SOUTHERN REGIONAL O f F I C E
B M W OF N O R T H A M E R I C A . I N C
7300 VALLEY VIEW L A N E , SUITE 9 0 0
P.O. BOX 340330

THE WARRANTy^SHALCBE NULL AND VOID IF:
the vehicle!* u ^ m j ^ ^ m p e t l t l v e events.

THIS WARIJjAN^

APPLY TO THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:

a. MalntedVrtcO^
and filters
b. Incandescent'bulbs'and fuses
c. Wheel alignment and balancing
d. Brake linings and brake pads
e. Windshield wiper blades
f. V-belts
g. Mechanical adjustments or repairs which become necessary through normal use, or wear and tear
h. Towing
I. Damage attributable to negligence, Improper treatment, or treatment contrary to the "owner's Handbook.9*
J. Oamage occurring through corrosion resulting from road salt, or Improper accident damage repairs.
k. Damage to a component or assembly due to the Installation of replacement parts with specifications that differ tftfl
any material respect from genuine BMW parts.
I. pamage attributable to failure to perform maintenance services at the specified Intervals or In accordance with t f i l
structlons In the "Owner's Manual." Proof must be provided either by a paid Invoice copy or filling in the approprtfi
boxes In the service manual,
m. Tires have a separate limited warranty from their respective manufacturer,
n. Any vehicle on which the odometer has been replaced or altered and the true mileage cannot be determined.
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LIMITEl&WAftRANTY _ 1932 MODELS
(Valid pnlytft the U.S.A.)
BMW of North America,Tnc.,%arrants this vehicle to be free of defects In materials or workmanship for a period of 3 yearift
36,000 miles, whichever' occurs first, commencing with the date the vehicle Is first licensed or placed in service a t f
"demonstrator" or "Company car." To obtain service under this warranty, the vehicle must be brought, upon discovery of US
defect, to the workshop of any authorized BMW dealer. This dealer will, without charge for parts or labor either repair^
replace the defective part(s). The decision to repair or replace said part(s) being wholly the responsibility of BMW of Nort
America, Inc. Parin for which replacements are made become the property of BMW of North America, Inc.
-AM
BMW of North America; Ind, makes no other express warranty on this product except the warranty as to the emission contra
system or the Limited Warranty-Rust Perforation. THE DURATION OF ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING THE fltf
PLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, IS LIMITED TO THE DURATION OF THE EXPRESS WARRANTY HEREIN. BMW6(
NORTH AMERICA, INC., HEREBY EXCLUDES INCIDENTAL ANO CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING LOSS OF TIME
INCONVENIENCE, OR LOSS OF USE OF THE VEHICLE, FOR ANY BREACH OF ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY, M
CLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, APPLICABLE TO THIS PRODUCT. Some states do not alld*
limitations on how long an Implied warranty lasts, or the exclusion or limitation of incidental or consequential damages, «
the above limitations and exclusions may not apply to you.
This warranty gives you specific legal rights, and you may also have other rights which vary from state to state. Any legS
claim or action arising from any express or Implied warranty contained herein must be brought within 12 months of the datejj
arises.
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VAN WAGONER & STEVENS
USWIS T. STEVENS (A3104)
SCOTT F. YOUNG (A3890)
215 South State Street
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1036
Attorneys for Defendant
BMW of North America, Inc.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS1
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
ENFORCEMENT OF SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT

HUGH SCHURTZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC.;
CLARK BUICK-DATSUN-GMOBMW,
INC. ; BMW OF MURRAY and DOES
I through X,

Civil No. C 84-7463

Judge Frank G. Noel
Defendants.
-

ooOoo

The evidentiary hearing on defendants1 Motion for
Enforcement of a Settlement Agreement came on regularly before
the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District Judge, on the 23rd day
of April, 1987, at the hour of 8:00 a.m.

The plaintiff Hugh

Schurtz was present and was represented by his counsel of
record,

David A. McPhie, Esq., of and for Hintze, Brown,

Faust, Blakesley & McPhie; and each of the defendants were
represented by their counsel of record.

The Court having reviewed

the pleadings on file

herein, the Memoranda of the parties, having received evidence
and exhibits, having considered the arguments of counsel and
being

fully

advised

in

the

premises,

hereby

makes

the

following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

On or about

February

17, 1987, plaintiff's

counsel contacted counsel for defendant BMW of North America,
Inc. ("BMW") and stated that plaintiff was willing to settle
all

claims

against

all

defendants

for

$18,000.00, with

plaintiff returning the car to defendants and a mutual release
by all parties.

2.
counsel

On February 18, 1987, after discussions between

for defendants and with their respective clients,

counsel for defendant BMW contacted plaintiff's counsel and
requested that plaintifffs offer of settlement be set forth in
a letter.

3.

On February 18, 1987, plaintifffs counsel had

hand delivered to counsel for defendants a letter confirming
plaintiff's

offer

to

settle

all

claims

and

disputes

outlined in a telephone conversation of February 17, 1987.

as

4.

Also on February 18, 1987, plaintiff's counsel

had hand delivered to counsel for defendants a second letter
extending the duration of plaintiff's offer from 8:00 a.m. on
February 19, 1987, to 2:00 p.m. on February 19, 1987.

5.
delivered

On

to

February

19,

plaintiff's

1987,

counsel

defendants

had hand

a

accepting

letter

plaintiff's offer of settlement as outlined in the two letters
of plaintiff's counsel, both dated February 18, 1987.

6.
plaintiff's

The

acceptance

counsel

prior

letter

to

the

was

received

expiration

time

by
of

plaintiff's offer of 2:00 p.m. on February 19, 1987.

7.
plaintiff's

Subsequent to receipt of the acceptance letter,
counsel

contacted

counsel

for

defendants

and

stated that plaintiff had informed his counsel that plaintiff
did not authorize plaintiff's counsel to settle the abovecaptioned litigation for the sum of $18,000.00.

8.

The Court

finds that the plaintiff did not

authorize his lawyer to settle this lawsuit for the sum of
$18,000.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
now makes the following Conclusions of Law:

1.

Under

the

laws

of

the

State

of

Utah,

authorization is required by the client before a settlement
made by the attorney will be binding on the client.

2.

An attorney has no implied authority to settle

his client's claim.

3.

It is the client's case, not the attorney's,

and the courts should refuse to enforce settlement agreements
where attorneys do not have specific authority to make the
settlement.

ORDER

Based

on

the

foregoing

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters the following Order:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion for
Enforcement of a Settlement Agreement be, and the same hereby
is, denied.

!"I I!.. ill,lik"In" FURTHER ORDERED t h a t t h i s Court T *
nf these proceedings hef
withdrawn

and tViri'

• , .• ,i!,*„i,., u i s ^ u v e i y

ami t h p same hereby •

" ' iiiirtit-.

..JiilJ

within t h i r t y

lilt

r e s p o n s e s t o an\

(30) days froL. ~ic -u*w^

lereof,

DATED this JL 7 ^ day of OrtoLei,

tav

.

THE COURT:
/ -

/

p6no
Thet honorable
Frank G Noel
District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
rINTZE, BROWN, FAUSTf
BLAKESLEY & McPHIE
uavid A McPhie

By:

Attorneys for Plaintiff

VAN WAGONER & STEVENS
Lewis T. S t e v e n s
S c o t t F . Young

By: ^ W ^ ,
Attorneys
North Ame

PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Val R. Antczak^
T. Patrick Casey A

By:

^___
Attbmeys 'for ^tiick-DatsunGMC-BMW, Inc. i BMW of
Murray
/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused a true and accurate
copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS1 MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY ENFORCEMENT OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT to be mailed this
^^

day of October, 1987, by depositing the same in the

United States mail, postage prepaid, to:

David A. McPhie, Esq.
HINTZE, BROWN, FAUST, BLAKESLEY & McPHIE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
3450 South Highland Drive
Suite 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Val R. Antczak, Esq.
T. Patrick Casey, Esq.
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants Clark
Buick-Datsun-GMC-BMW, INC. and
BMW of Murray
185 South State Street
Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

^^^f.
105Y.4

